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Vasconi, Mark J., M.A., June, 1983 Economies
Wholesale Price - Retail Price Relationships: An Aspect of Price 
Fixing in a Retail Gasoline Market (69 pp.)
Director: Dr. Dennis J. O'Donnell
The purpose of this thesis was to determine if pricing patterns 
between retail gasoline stations in a market area were affected 
by the pattern of wholesale gasoline prices for stations in that 
market area. Daily retail gasoline prices were gathered from six 
retail gasoline stations. Daily wholesale gasoline prices were 
received from two of the six stations. The retail price informa­
tion covered a period beginning on January 2, 1977 running to 
May 31, 1979. The wholesale prices started on January 2, 1977 and 
continued to March 31, 1979. These data were used in two stati­
stical procedures, both of which are based on regression analysis: 
1) Chow tests were used to ascertain if pricing patterns between 
stations changed over time in response to the publication of a 
newspaper article which alleged collusive practices in a particu­
lar gasoline market; 2) Regression analysis, in conjunction with 
the analysis of covariance, was utilized to determine if daily 
retail prices of gasoline were reflections of the daily wholesale 
price of gasoline. This thesis reconfirmed earlier research indi­
cating that retail pricing patterns between stations changed over 
the publication of the newspaper article. Of primary significance, 
this thesis found that daily wholesale price of gasoline had no 
statistical influence on the determination of daily retail gaso­
line prices. The findings in this thesis further suggest the 
inference of collusion by retail gasoline stations located in 
the market area studied.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
On March 2 8 r 1979 the State of Montana filed an
antitrust suit against a set of gasoline retailers operating 
in Missoula, Montana. The law suit was brought as a 
response to price fixing allegations that appeared in
Missoula's daily newspaper. The Missoulian.fl9.pa.l) The 
date of the article's publication was March 18, 1978. Dr. 
Dennis O'Donnell conducted economic research on the pattern 
of daily retail gasoline prices among six retail outlets 
representing five firms.(21,pg.1-13) These five firms were 
included in the law suit filed on March 28, 1979 by the 
Attorney General's Office of the State of Montana. Four of 
these five firms eventually settled out of court leaving 
only one firm, represented by two outlets, in the suit by
the time O'Donnell's analysis was conducted.
Each of the six stations in 1979 were "independent" 
marketers and continue to operate as such today. The 
gasoline industry contains three general stages: Crude oil
production; refining; and, marketing. An "independent"
marketer is one which is involved in only one or tv/o stages 
of the gasoline industry.(9,pg.4-6)
1
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The daily retail price data used in O'Donnell's 
research ran from January 2, 1977 to May 31, 1979,
inclusive. This is a period of 870 days for each of the six 
outlets. The wholesale price data used in O'Donnell's study 
was received from the two stations that continued in the 
suit. These two stations are operated under the auspices of 
one company. Wholesale price observations ran from January 
2, 1977 to March 31,1979, a period of 810 days.
Research was initiated by charting price changes for 
each station over time. This analysis produced results 
which, when visually inspected, showed three distinct 
periods of price change relationships among the six 
retailers. The three periods are:
Period 1 - January 2, 1977 to March 19,1978; 
Period 2 - March 20 ,1978 to July 17,1978; 
Period 3 - July 18,1978 to May 31,1978.
The Missoulian's article appeared two days before the 
beginning of Period 2. The publication of this article 
represents a non-market event that should not precipitate 
alterations in the economic behavior of these six 
"independent" outlets; therefore, a comparison of retail 
price relationships among firms from Period 1 to Period 2 is 
of great interest. If independent competitive behavior is 
present in Missoula's gasoline market, the price
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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relationships among stations should not change from one 
period to the next as a result of a non-market 
e v e n t ,{17,p g .1) The competitive process does not give firms 
or groups of firms power over prices; thus, they lack the 
ability to respond to non-market events by altering their 
price behavior.
Given the suggestion of three distinctly different 
periods, Dr. O'Donnell conducted Ordinary Least Squares 
regressions to statistically verify the presence of three 
different periods. The regressions he used were conducted 
on four statistical models over each of the three suspected 
periods. These four models were specified as follows:
(1) Pl=f(P3,P4,P5,P6 and T) ;
(2) Pl=f(P3,P4,P5,P6 and WPl) ;
(3) P2=f(P3,P4,P5,P6 and T) ;
(4) P2=f(P3,P4,P5,P6 and WP2) .
Where : Pl=daily retail price of gasoline at Station 1;
P2 = I I I t II I I I I 2;
P3 = I f I t f t II II 3;
P4 = I f I f I I I I I I 4;
P5 = I f I I II I t II 5;
P6 = I f I I II If i f 6;
T=Integer value of each day from 1/2/77 to 5/31/79; 
WPl=Daily wholesale price of regular at Station 1; 
WP2= " " " " " " " 2,
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It should be noted that only Stations 1 and 2 were used 
as dependent variables. As was stated earlier, these two 
stations were operated by the only firm which opted to 
continue in the suit brought by the State of Montana. It 
should also be noted that the names of each station will 
remain anonymous. One should also bear in mind that 
economic theory lacks guidelines in the task of defining 
time periods. Therefore, Dr. O'Donnell used an empirical 
approach to break these data into periods.
Regression results on models 1 through 4 indicate 
patterns in the estimates of R-squared and t-statistics. 
R-squared results are as follows:
Kod_ei 1 g.g£ipd 2
(1) R^=.93 4 R^ =.657 if =.983
(2) R^=.944 R^=.6 51 r2 = . 94 8
(3) R^=.921 R^ = . 6 4 9 r2 = . 98 3
(4) R^=.920 R^=.643 r 2 = . 948
From the R-squared results, it is evident that Period 2 
exhibits price relationships among firms which are very 
different from price relationships in Periods 1 or 3. 
Estimates of t-statistics, as generated on WPl and WP2 in 
models 2 and 4, indicate other patterns.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Model Period 1. Pec iod 2 Per iod 3
(2) t=-1.058 t= 1.376 t=-0.737
(4) t=-0.692 t= 1.584 t=-0.697
Results on the t-statistic indicate that at the 5% 
level of significance the wholesale price of regular 
gasoline is not a statistically significant determinate on 
the retail price. In other words, the wholesale price of 
gasoline has no effect on the retail price for either model 
nor for any period. However, in Period 2, the variables 
representing wholesale price (WPl and WP2) appear to be more 
influential contributors on retail price determination. The 
estimates on R-squared and t-statistics indicated 
alterations in relationships which determined retail price. 
Dr. O'Donnell then utilized Chow tests to ascertain if the 
relationships in each model differed from Period 1 to Period
2. The results of the Chow test indicated that for each of 
the four models, there was indeed a significant change in 
the relationships which determined retail price at Stations 
1 and 2.
Dr. O'Donnell also conducted regression analysis on 
models (1), (2), (3), and (4) with lagged variables. The
variables were lagged from one to seven time periods (i.e. 
days) in order to determine if daily retail prices at 
Stations 1 and 2 moved in lagged pattern with regards to 
other variables. It was found that regressions on lagged
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variables proved to be no different from regressions on 
unlagged variables.
Statement jqI Problem
Dr. O'Donnell's results indicated that Stations 1 and 
2 changed pricing behavior after the publication of The 
Missoulian's article. However, Dr. O'Donnell's research 
conducted only limited tests on the relationship of retail 
prices to wholesale prices. Using somewhat more
sophisticated tools than those used by O'Donnell, the task 
of this thesis is to determine if the pattern of price 
relationships among competitors is an indication of 
independent competitive behavior or collusion. This task 
will be completed by utilizing two approaches.
First, this thesis will repeat O'Donnell's analysis by 
looking at the relationships among retail price movements 
for the six stations to see if they altered from Period 1 to 
Period 2 as a response to a non-market event (i.e. The 
Missoulian's article of March 18, 1978). If price
relationships among stations change from Period 1 to Period 
2, the possibility of collusive behavior is strong. On the 
other hand, if price relationships between stations do not
change from Period 1 to Period 2, the inference of
independent competitive behavior can be advanced. In this 
thesis, the specification of wholesale price variables is 
improved over previous work; thus the analysis will focus
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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on results derived from respecified variables.
Second, this thesis will determine if retail price 
movements are reflections of movements in wholesale prices. 
The relationship of retail prices and wholesale prices is 
only one issue pertaining to market behavior. Demand 
fluctuations, and the character of price fluctuations, 
themselves, are other issues which relate to market 
behavior. Therefore, in the process of drawing inference on 
the possibility of collusion, one must be careful to not 
overstate a conclusion because wholesale price-retail price 
relationships are only a part of the overall market process. 
However, if retail prices are not statistically related to 
wholesale prices, the inference of collusion is given added 
strength. Alternatively, if retail prices are shown to be 
statistically related to wholesale prices, the inference of 
independent competitive behavior is defensible.
The methodology chosen to study the issue of wholesale 
price relationships to retail prices incorporates regression 
analysis on two models:
(1) Pl=f(P3,P4,P5,P6 and WPl)
and
(2) P2=f(P3,P4,P5,P6 and WP2).
Because time series data for retail and wholesale prices is 
used, the data must first be corrected for autocorrelation. 
The method used to correct the data is called the Durbin
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Two-Step.{15rpg.224-25) Once the data is corrected, 
regression analysis is conducted on each of the two models 
for each of the three periods. These regressions produce 
statistical results which are in turn used in Chow tests. 
The results of the Chow tests between periods indicate that 
regressions for Period 1 on each of the two models are 
significantly different from regressions for Periods 2 or 3. 
In other words, the regression for Period 1 differs from the 
regression which represents price behavior in Period 2 and 
it is also different from the regression equation of Period
3. The Chow test, which compares regression equations of 
Period 2 to equations of Period 3, indicates no statistical 
differences in the equations for each of the last two 
periods.
Differences in the regression equations may be due to a 
change in the slope of the regression line or a change in 
the Y-intercept term. The analysis of covariance is 
utilized to determine if the differences identified by the 
Chow tests are attributable to a change in the Y-intercept 
or a change in the slope of the regression line as 
identified by the coefficient on wholesale price in each of 
the two m o d e l s .(15,p g .282-83 : 22,p g .610-21) Through the 
analysis of covariance, it is found that the coefficients on 
wholesale price do not significantly change over time, nor 
does the term representing the Y-intercept change; 
therefore, one can only conclude that the differences 
between regressions over each oer iod emanate from
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Page 9
alterations in coefficients on competitors' prices. These 
results confirm the analysis reported by O'Donnell in his 
report to the Attorney General's Office of the State of 
M o n t a n a . (21,pg.13)
Another test is utilized which determines if wholesale 
prices alter over time. This test uses regression analysis 
for the purpose of finding corroborating evidence on the 
stability of wholesale prices. Four general models are used 
which try to identify possible shifts in the pattern of 
wholesale prices. They are as follows:
(3) W P l = f ( T, D.V.);
(4) W P I = f ( T, T Squared, D.V . ) ;
(5) WP2=f( T, D.V.);
(6) WP2=f( T, T Squared, D.V.).
Where: T Squared=The squared value of each integer day (T);
D.V.=Dummy Variable of either 0 or 1.
Models 3,4,5 and 6 show that there was no shift in the 
pattern of wholesale costs over the publication date of The 
Missoulian's article. Given known alterations in 
price-setting relationships at Stations 1 and 2 from Period 
1 to Period 2, there is no evidence which suggests that 
wholesale prices influenced the manner in which retail 
prices changed. The inference of independent competitive 
behavior is difficult to advance.
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Chapter Two explores publications which address three 
major areas of the literature. First, the theory of perfect 
competition is outlined by presenting its basic assumptions 
and the price and quantity movements which the theory 
describes. Second, the manner in which retail gasoline 
prices are set will be presented through the works of Ralph 
Cassady Jr. and Leonard W. Weiss. Third, a review of 
empirical publications attempting to outline procedures
which have been used in the past to make inferences 
regarding the presence collusive practices in the
marketplace.
Chapter Three presents a review of the data utilized in 
the statistical tests . This chapter also articulates the 
exact statistical procedure used to evaluate the
relationship between retail prices to wholesale prices.
Chapter Four presents the actual statistical procedure 
and the derived results.
Chapter Five is then a formulation of conclusions, 
policy recommendations, and a statement on the limitations 
of the approach used in this thesis.
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Introduction
Chapter Two addresses five basic issues crucial to the 
theoretical foundation of this thesis. First, the concept 
of market structure is presented. In this section, the
assumptions pertinent to each market setting are stated. 
The situation faced by retail gasoline outlets is then 
matched to a perfectly competitive market structure. 
Second, the theory of perfect competition is briefly 
outlined. Third, a presentation of Ralph Cassady's analysis 
of how retail gasoline prices are determined compared to the 
perfectly competitive model. In this section, the 
economists' abstract models are embellished to develop a 
model of competition descriptive of activities in a retail 
gasoline market. Fourth, a review of empirical literature 
which addresses methods of investigating the presence of 
collusion on prices. Fifth, is an overview of empirical
approaches that one can pursue given the literature as one 
evaluates a retail gasoline market for signs of collusive
prices setting behavior.
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Market Structure
Economics generally tries to solve three basic
questions: What to produce? How to produce? Who will
benefit? Taken as a whole, these issues are called the 
economic problem.(24,p g .1) The process of solving the 
"economic problem" has been greatly facilitated by
distinguishing between various economic settings or market 
structures. Different market structures result in different 
answers to the problems of economics.(24,p g .4)
Economists have classified market structure into four 
basic categories, representing a continuum of organization 
based on the number of firms in a market or industry. Aside 
from the number of firms in an industry, market structures 
are also defined by the homogeneity of the products 
s o l d .(24,p g .10) At one extreme of this organizational
continuum is monopoly. Monopoly markets are characterized 
by only one seller who is supplying a good or service to 
customers. Perfect competition lies at the other extreme on 
this continuum. Perfectly competitive markets are those in 
which many sellers function and offer as a group, a 
homogeneous product. Within this continuum one finds the 
market structures of monopolistic competition and 
oligopoly.(18,p g .233) Monopolistic competition is
characterized by many sellers and product differentiation. 
Products are differentiated by advertising, slight cosmetic 
alterations, and slight physical alterations. Each
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competitor then sells a product that is slightly different 
from products marketed by other sellers. (14,pg.308)
Oligopoly markets are normally characterized by few sellers. 
The major point of definition in describing an oligopoly 
market speaks to the issue of interdependent decision 
making. Given the small number of firms, a decision by one 
firm will prompt a decision by a competitor. Therefore, all 
producers recognize interdependence as a fact of their 
business environment.(26,pg.414)
Perfect competition, aside from having many independent 
sellers, each of whom markets an identical and homogeneous 
product, is further defined by two more requirements: 
Perfect knowledge of the marketplace; and, free entry and 
exit of firms.(10,pg,223-24) These four requirements are
sufficient structural conditions for the definition of 
perfect competition.(14,pg.241)
The necessary condition for the existence of a
perfectly competitive market is that each firm sees itself 
as a price taker in both input and output 
m a r k e t s .(14,pg.241) In a perfectly competitive environment, 
there exist so many independent firms that production
decisions by one seller has no effect on the market price of 
inputs or outputs.
The marketing of homogeneous products insures that the 
the consumer is indifferent between two sellers.(18,p g .234) 
Perfect knowledge implies that all consumers are fully aware 
of all prices in a market.(20,p g .237). Free entry and exit
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is present and is associated with the free mobility of 
resources.(18,pg.235) Mobility of resources speaks to the 
ability of resource inputs to move freely into or out of a 
market or a particular use. It further implies that labor 
is free to move from one job to another and that inputs are 
not monopolized by any one producer or owner.(10,p g .224}
Gasoline retailing is related to the conditions which 
define a perfectly competitive market.{5,p g .336-45) The 
situation faced by retailers in Missoula, Montana 
approximates, to a high degree, the market setting described 
by perfect competition. First, there are many gasoline 
retailers in Missoula, Montana. Of the over sixty 
retailers, approximately 50% are independent
marketers.(personal observation) Second, the gasoline sold 
in Missoula is physically homogeneous among all competitors. 
All gasoline sold in Missoula comes from refineries in 
Billings, Montana via the Yellowstone pipeline.(Court 
testimony of J .Gary Louqet, June 4,1982) The Yellowstone 
pipeline starts in Billings and runs west to Moses Lake, 
Washington. Third, consumers in Missoula have, if not 
perfect knowledge, very good knowledge on the prices of 
regular gasoline at most outlets in the city. Most 
retailers post the price of self-service regular on large 
signs which readily relay prices to passing motorists. 
Fourth, entry and exit in Missoula's gasoline market does 
not appear to be difficult. The fact that free entry exists 
in the Missoula market is demonstrated by observing that
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Missoula has gasoline outlets operated by "major" brand 
companies, "independent" marketers, convenience stores, and 
even a butcher shop. Leonard Weiss confirms the general 
situation of easy entry into a gasoline market by stating 
that "Would-be proprietors need very little capital to enter 
the business, and, since the skills involved are widely 
known and hope springs eternal, there is practically no 
limit to the number of potential operators as well as 
stations."(27,p g .413)
ThS. Theoyy of Perfect Competition
The model of perfect competition outlines the
determination of market price for both the firm and the 
market in three separate time periods. The shortest time 
period is known as the market period followed by the short 
run and the long r u n . (18,p g .236) The distinction between 
time periods is dependent upon the length of time it takes a 
firm to vary inputs. In the market period, output is fixed 
by the supply of resources at hand. In the short run,
output can vary by changing the utilization of variable
inputs. In the long run, output is variable because all 
inputs, can be changed.(10,p g .226)
Market Period Equilibrium
Given that input levels are absolutely fixed for a
particular time horizon, a firm cannot instantaneously 
change its output levels.(20,p g .238) In the market period, a
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firm can sell the quantities it has at the going market 
price. (18rpg.236) The industry supply is simply the 
horizontal summation of each firm's supply. Therefore, 
industry supply is fixed during a market period while price 
is strictly determined by the level of demand the industry 
is facing. Equilibrium is identified by the price at which 
the market is cleared.(10,p g .226) Price movements are 
completely dictated by demand for the product. To 
reiterate, in a market period, supply alone determines 
equilibrium quantity while demand alone determines 
equilibrium price. This situation is an extreme contrast to 
short run and long run conditions. In the short run or long 
run, equilibrium prices and outputs are determined 
simultaneously by the interaction of demand and supply.
Short Run Equilibrium
Firm Equilibrium
The determination of short run equilibrium begins with 
an understanding of a firm's supply decisions. In markets 
where firms are price takers (i.e. perfectly competitive 
markets), a firm may sell as many units of output as it can 
at a given and fixed price.(2,pg.313) At first glance, this 
is a rather intuitive and simple statement. However, a firm 
can only sell as many units as it can supply. The ability 
of a firm to supply a particular level of output is defined
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by its supply schedule. To adequately understand what 
represents a supply schedule the concept of marginal cost 
must be presented.
Marginal cost is the additional cost a producer incurs
to produce one extra unit of output.{14,p g .226) The concept
of marginal cost is important because it embodies a
statement on the kind of technology a firm has and the
costs of inputs utilized in production.(20,p g .195-96) In 
most production techniques, the additional cost of producing 
one additional unit of output declines over low levels of 
production, then, after reaching some point of output, 
begins to rise as output is increased.(14,p g .226) For a 
perfectly competitive firm, the the relationship of marginal 
cost to output levels, above minimum marginal cost, is known 
as the supply schedule. The supply schedule is in turn an 
expression of how much a firm will be able to supply at a 
given price.
Given a supply schedule derived from marginal cost 
relationships to output levels, a firm's equilibrium output 
is determined by the market p r i c e .(18,p g .237) A firm's 
output is in equilibrium where the market price is equal to 
the marginal cost of production.(10,p g .233) As the market 
price mov e s , equilibrium output will also move. When price 
goes up, the quantity supplied will go up. Likev/ise, when 
price goes down, the quantity supplied will also go down.
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In the short run the only adjustment a firm can make is 
in the quantity of output it can supply to the market. The 
price which a perfectly competitive firm charges is
determined by the market demand. Therefore, price is set 
independent of a firm's desired price or its internal 
production process.
Industry Equilibrium
As with the short run equilibrium of the firm, where 
equilibrium quantity is defined by the market price and a 
firm's supply schedule; short run industry equilibrium is 
defined in the same manner. The only difference in
formulating industry equilibrium emanates from the
derivation of the industry supply schedule.
In the simplest case, the short run industry supply 
schedule is a summation of individual firms' supply
schedules {i.e. marginal cost schedules). However, this 
technique of simple summation is appropriate only when an 
expansion of industry supply does not affect input prices.
Normally when all firms increase output simultaneously,
there is a noticeable effect on input prices.(14,p g .257)
To illustrate the effect of rising input prices with 
expanding output, one can examine farming as an industry. 
If one farmer were to increase output (i.e. supply) by
increasing the level of inputs, there would be no 
appreciable change in the market prices of tractors,
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fertilizer or seed. However, if all farmers increased 
output through increasing inputs, a producer's marginal cost 
schedule will shift upwards. This means that for any one 
additional unit of output, the additional cost will also 
increase over previous levels.(10,p g .237) As marginal cost 
shifts upward, the amount of quantity supplied at any one 
price will fall from previous output levels.(10,p g .237) 
Consequently, the derivation of an industry supply schedule, 
when based upon mere summation of individual supply 
schedules, will not be an accurate representation of 
potential output at a given market price.
Short run industry equilibrium in price and quantity is 
achieved when demand and supply are equal. At the 
equilibrium price, the firm will adjust its production to 
equilibrium levels of output. When both the industry and 
firm are in equilibrium, it is known as full 
equilibrium. (14.pg.259) Given full equilibrium, where firms 
are earning positive profits and there is no entry of new 
firms, output level will not change.
In a market where there is full equilibrium, the market 
supply, in the short run is fixed. Therefore, the only 
determinate of equilibrium price is the quantity 
d e m anded.(10,p g .239) The quantity demanded of a particular 
good or service is a reflection of income, consumer tastes 
and preferences, and demographic considerations of 
population growth.{26,p g .88) Therefore, the derivation of an 
equilibrium price through adjustments in demand has a random
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element. Preston and King hold that competition in a market 
can be statistically appraised by analyzing regression 
residuals.(23,p g .803) A residual is defined by the 
difference between an observed value and the predicted value 
of a dependent variable as generated by a regression 
procedure. If the residuals demonstrate a normal 
distribution, they are random and representative of 
competitive market behavior. If the residuals demonstrate a 
distribution which is not random, the inference of collusion 
is given credibility,(23,p g .803-04)
Dr. O'Donnell employed a "goodness-of-fit" technique 
to analyze the residuals of the regressions he produced. 
The technique he used was the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. He 
found that the residuals of the regressions did not conform 
to a normal distribution. This suggests that some force 
came between the buyer and seller that biased the 
relationships away from a competitive process.
Long Run Equilibrium
Given that in the long run all inputs are variable, 
including plant size, long run firm adjustments are dictatea 
by the plans of other firms. If profits in an industry are 
positive, existing firms may increase plant capacity, new 
firms may enter the industry, or both. Expansion of 
industry output will reduce the market price. As output 
continues to expand the market price will continue to fall.
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With falling market prices, profits will fall for firms in 
the industry. Unless industry output levels are reduced, 
profits will continue to fall to levels where losses are 
incurred industry-wide.(18,pg.244) As losses continue to 
mount, firms will leave the industry or firms will reduce 
their output levels. Firm exit will continue until profits 
are neither positive nor negative.
A firm operating in the short run will adjust its 
output levels to a point where the market price is equal to 
its marginal cost. Movements of this type are profit
maximizing. However, in the long run, plant capacity is
variable and the entrepreneur can select the industry in 
which his capital will operate most profitably.(10,pg.246) 
Long run equilibrium, where excess profit is zero, is 
reached when price is equal not only to the short run
marginal cost, but also to long run marginal cost. When
this long run condition is satisfied, firms maximize profits 
and entry is discouraged.(2,p g .315)
Price Determination At Retail Gasoline Outlets
Before moving into a discussion on how retail gasoline 
prices are determined, some distinctions between theory and 
practice must be made. Gasoline retailing in Missoula 
conforms to the assumptions of perfect competition in terms 
of the number of participants, the sale of a homogeneous 
product, free entry and exit, and perfect knowledge.
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However, retail price determination has elements of price 
setting and interdependence which are in direct contrast to 
the criteria of independent action and price taking as 
advanced in the theory of perfect competition. This does 
not mean that the theory of perfect competition has no place 
in assessing the problem at hand. In fact, over the long 
run, the theory of perfect competition is a very useful tool 
for describing the relationship of retail prices to costs 
(i.e. wholesale prices). This long run relationship shows 
that retail prices must approximate wholesale prices, 
otherwise there will be excessive entry or excessive exit. 
In the long run, the theory of perfect competition provides 
a standard by which market behavior can be judged. In the 
case at hand, retail price determination, in practice, 
differs from price determination in theory.
Not only does the theory of perfect competition differ 
from the the realities of retail price decisions, but the 
concept of competition advanced by theory has little 
relation to the concept of competition advanced in antitrust 
law. Competition, as modeled by antitrust legislation, 
implies the absence of monopoly power or practices which 
secure monopoly profits, one of which is collusion among 
sellers. This definition has great collusion and is not 
nearly as specific as theoretical definitions for 
competitive behavior.
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Ralph Cassady, Jr. in Price Making and Price Behavior 
in the Petroleum Industry has analyzed the forces which 
determine retail gasoline prices.
An outlet's retail gasoline pricing decisions are a 
reflection of a number of considerations:
(1) Prices are a reflection of the type of retail
outlet.
(2) Prices are determined, to an extent, by the
type of competitive methods available to the
retailer.
(3) Prices are set by considering the vertical
influences upon a dealer.
(4) Price levels are affected by horizontal
pressures (i.e. Collusion).
(5) Prices are a reflection of the gasoline
volumes normally marketed by a retailer.
Each of these five considerations are presented in this 
section.
Typg of Ret^iX
Retail outlets differ markedly from one another. The
difference from one to another is usually defined by the 
terms of the supplier-retailer relationship. Normally there 
are three classes of retail operations. They are classified
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as follows:
A. Company owned and operated stations. This
type of relationship is present when the
supplier not only owns the station, but also 
operates the station via an employee.
B. Company-owned but lessee operated stations.
In this operating scheme, the supplier owns
the outlet, but leases it to a dealer.
C. Dealer-owned and operated. Here, the dealer
who operates the station is also the owner.
The dealer is independent of the supplier 
except for product contracts.(5,p g .236)
A large proportion of outlets are administered under 
the company-owned, dealer-operated option. Many companies 
will buy locations in a city and lease them to a dealer. 
This enables a company to blanket a market area. This form
of operation does not rely upon less predictable methods of
acquiring a good location. These company-owned,
dealer-operated stations are usually more profitable than 
others whose product supply may not be as 
reliable.(5,p g .237)
Possibly the largest segment of retail stations are 
independently owned and operated. In this situation, 
suppliers only have a contractual relationship to dealers.
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However, in spite of their large numbers, independents 
market a smaller share of gasoline than do "major" oil 
companies.(5,pg.238)
Control relationships between retailers and suppliers 
are important because different relationships dictate 
different opportunities for rivals to acquire locations. If 
a supplier owns and operates a station, the chances for a 
competitor to acquire the location are small. If a supplier 
leases the property from its owner, the risk of losing the 
location upon expiration of the lease is high. The most 
promising market for rivals is one characterized by many 
independent stations. These stations are normally bound to 
a supplier through product contracts. Many rivals may 
attempt to acquire an independent station by proposing 
better contractual terms,{5,p g .238)
The differences in supplier-operator relationships also 
manifest themselves in pricing responsibilities. At 
company-owned and operated stations, pricing is solely 
determined by the supplier. At company leased stations the 
lessee normally sets prices. At owner operated outlets, the 
owner has full responsibility for pricing
policies.(5,pg.239)
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The Individual Dealer and Competitive Tools
The individual dealer has a set of competitive tools 
which aid in price determination and the expansion of sales. 
First, a dealer may rely on appeals such as advertising to 
attract customers. Second, a dealer may offer more 
ancillary products to gain consumer patronage. Third, 
efforts to increase sales may rely on price reductions of 
ancillary products rather than gasoline. Fourth, selective 
or secret price concessions may be made to gain or maintain 
business. Fifth, a dealer may initiate direct price 
reductions on gasoline.{5,p g .240)
The competitive tools expressed above must be 
considered in terms of a retailer's market situation. 
Considerations must be made pertaining to a number of 
factors. These factors include the level of competition, 
profit requirements, product line reputations, and the 
degree of a rival's influence on pricing decisions. Most 
importantly, a retailer must base a great deal of his 
competitive efforts on price adjustment. If his pricing 
system is not flexible, he will lose volume during periods 
of falling market prices or he will lose product during in a 
period of rising market prices. Therefore, given a 
particular location, a particular number of competitors, 
e t c . the competitive tools a dealer uses are largely 
predetermined by the market environment.(5,p g .241)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Page 27
As an example, small independent dealers have to sell 
gasoline below price charged by company owned stations. A 
lower market price, relative to a price at a company owned 
station, is necessary to make up for a poor location and few 
ancillary services.(5,p g .241)
Elasticity of demand is another consideration which 
dictates the appropriate competitive approach. While the 
market elasticity of demand for gasoline is generally low 
(i.e. inelastic), the elasticity of demand at a particular 
station is generally high. This means that price levels are 
a very important tool for all gasoline dealers, especially 
for independent outlets. Company-owned and operated 
stations will be reluctant to engage in blatant price 
competition for fear of triggering harmful price 
w a r s .(27,p g ,412)
In conclusion, a retailer has a set of competitive 
tools at his disposal. The choice of tools, however, is 
limited by market factors and demand elasticities.
Vertical Influences on Retail Pricing
In any discussion of gasoline pricing, one must 
consider vertical influences such as wholesale price and the 
policies of the supplier. Generally the wholesale price of 
gasoline is closely tied to the retail price a dealer 
c h a r g e s .(5,p g .243) Any change in retail wholesale price is 
normally reflected by a change in retail prices. However, a
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dealer may be reluctant to pass on a one cent price increase 
fearful that sales volume will be reduced, thereby yielding 
lower revenue.(5,pg.244)
A supplier's pricing policies also effect retail 
prices. Given high elasticity of demand at a particular 
station, a supplier will retain some degree of control over 
pricing decisions at retail operations.{5,p g .244) This is 
necessary to avert possible price wars initiated by a 
retailer's sloppy price moves. Therefore, a supplier may 
utilize one of the following policies:
(1). The supplier may exert complete control over 
price levels.
(2). The supplier may grant the dealer complete 
pricing authority.
(3). The supplier may retain an interest in 
setting prices. This is usually done by 
giving advice to the retailer.(5,p g .245)
Of the three policies a supplier may employ, the thira 
is utilized most frequently.
Horizontal Influences oji Retail Pricing
One cannot ignore the fact that at times a dealer's 
pricing has been influenced by prices at other stations or 
other horizontal pressures such as collusion.(5,pg.246)
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Dealers must protect margins in order to prosper, trade 
associations exist in many localities to protect the common 
interests and goals of the proprietors.
Certain vehicles of horizontal pricing, such as 
parallel pricing between competitors, are not per se illegal 
unless an agreement is present.(5,p g .247)
Relationship of Sales Volume fg. Exices
High elasticity of demand for a particular station 
implies that a small alteration in price will result in a 
significant change in the quantity demanded. Therefore, it 
is very common to observe a station cutting its price in an 
effort to increase sales volume and possibly revenue. As 
long as a price reduction is not met by competitors, a 
station will increase its volume. However, if a price cut 
is matched by other dealers, sales volume will not change 
significantly.(5,pg.252) This is caused by a difference in 
elasticity between the market and a particular 
station.(27,p g .411)
Review of Empirical Literatuxe
Richard Posner, a leading authority in antitrust 
economics has stated that "Economically significant 
collusion should leave some visible traces in the pricing 
behavior of the mar k e t , ...".(17,p g .1) Using P o s n e r 's
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hypothesis, John M.Kuhlman employed standard statistical 
measurements of means and frequency distribution to study 
price behavior among firms charged with collusion in an 
unidentified bid-rigging suit. This study used data 
recorded over a time period of six years for a sealed bid 
ma r k e t .
Kuhlman divided the data into four periods. He then 
analyzed means and frequency distributions to identify the 
dispersion of bid prices from firm to firm.
Kuhlman's analysis found that in Periods 1 and 2, there 
was very little dispersion, while in Period 3 the dispersion 
increased slightly as result of firm entry. In Period 4 the 
level of dispersion increased significantly.(17,p g .17) The 
increases in price dispersion in Period 4 are interesting 
because the filing date of the antitrust suit initiates the 
begining of the fourth and final period.
Prior to the filing date of the law suit, over 50% of 
the market showed a price dispersal of less than 2%. After 
the filing date of the law suit, during Period 4, the number 
of firms registering a 2% price dispersal dropped to under 
25%. This decrease was accompanied by an increase in the 
number of firms which had larger differentials. (17,pg.8)
Kuhlman concludes his analysis by advancing the 
proposition that variations in price dispersions after a 
non-market event, such as the filing of a law suit, are 
"visible traces" of effective collusion.(17,pg.l8)
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John Kuhlman's work on the issue of statistical
tracking of prices has spawned work by other authors. One 
such author, Allen W. Blair, has promoted the use of 
K u h l m a n 's methodology. He basically produces discussion 
which centers on the fact that uniform pricing is an 
indication of horizontal pricing influences.(4,pg.686) 
However, he qualifies his discussion with the fact that 
uniform prices are to be expected if costs among competitors 
are equal. The difficulty of interpreting uniform prices as 
evidence of collusion rests with understanding normal market 
operations. As a result of his qualification, a computer 
becomes a useful tool in discovering relationships which are 
not explained by market forces.
Since market forces play a central role in pricing
decisions, one must examine a market environment before 
claiming that price uniformity is an indication of illegal 
horizontal pricing activities.(4,pg.687) The possibility of 
collusion is normally thought to be high in oligopoly 
markets where interdependent decision making is a defining 
characteristic. However, interdependence dictates that 
price adjustments be made as a response to a competitor's 
decisions. Economists disagree over the question of uniform 
prices as a possible indicator of collusion in oligopoly 
markets.(4,pg.689)
The argument concerning uniform prices and their 
relationship to collusion, when considering many firms and 
many buyers, is somewhat more settled, at least in Blair's
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analysis. He feels that in a perfectly competitive market 
uniform prices are strong indicators of collusive practices, 
Blair states:
In a market composed of many buyers and 
sellersr the economic pressures resulting from 
interdependence are absent. Thus, if price 
uniformity occurs in a normal marketplace the 
inference of collusion is strengthened because the 
oligopolistic forces are not in effect. Collusion 
is easier to detect and adherence to the 
price-fixing agreement is more difficult to 
enforce because there are a larger number of 
participants.(4,pg.689)
One must be aware of the fact that Blair's analysis of 
uniform prices is only revealing in the instance of 
divergent costs among competitors. If costs are equal 
between competing firms, one would expect uniform prices. 
Given this point, one can see that costs for each gasoline 
retailer studied herein are probably different. Different 
costs are likely because of different hours of operation and 
different ancillary products.
Blair moves on to suggest market characteristics which 
promote horizontal pricing activities. It is his feeling 
that price tracking analysis should focus on markets 
characterized by a homogeneous product, inelastic demand, 
stable technology, sealed bids and substantial barriers to 
entry. However, he does not suggest limiting price tracking 
analysis to markets that completely fit the characteristics 
just mentioned.(4,p g .691) One can easily see that the 
situation facing gasoline retailers is one which can be
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addressed by Kuhlman's empirical methodology. The gasoline 
sold is of a homogeneous quality, market demand is inelastic 
(6,pg.380) and the technology necessary to market gasoline 
seems to be relatively stable. However, Missoula's gasoline 
market does not operate on a sealed bid basis and one might 
suspect that the barriers to entry into the gasoline 
retailing business are not h i g h , (27,p g .431).
When a price tracking analysis is attempted, Blair 
indicates particular relationships which should be studied. 
These relationships include the detection of (1) geographic 
market divisions: (2) periodicity in price behavior which
follows a systematic pattern over time: (3) price
relationships among sellers: (4) price relationships over
space: (5) price relationships over time.(4,p g .692) Blair
concludes his analysis with a presentation on Kuhlman's 
results.
Dale R. Funderburk has also studied competitive 
behavior from the approach suggested by Kuhlman.(12,p g .62) 
He feels that price tracking is a valid approach because the 
discovery of a "Hot Document" is very rare. He, like 
Kuhlman, used objective market data in studying competition 
in Oklahoma's liquid asphalt industry. Funderburk found 
that sales of asphalt to the State of Oklahoma showed 
uniform prices between all firms considered. As in 
Kuhlman's study, Funderburk found that price uniformity was 
reduced after the filing of an antitrust suit against 
members of the liquid asphalt industry in
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Oklahoma.(12,pg.69)
Lee E. Preston and Benjamin King analyzed price and
cost data to address the question of competition.(23fpg.790) 
Instead of tracking prices they utilized correlation 
analysis to discover if prices were related, over time, to 
costs. They also used time series data in regression 
analysis where the residuals were examined by a 
"goodness-of-fit" test. If residuals demonstrated a random 
pattern (i.e. normal distribution), an inference of 
competitive behavior was strengthened. However, if
regression residuals demonstrated a non-random pattern, a 
departure from competitive behavior was
suggested.(23,p g .803) The analysis of residuals relates back 
to the earlier assertion on the random manner in which a 
market price is determined at full equilibrium. Since 
supply is fixed in the short run, the only other influence 
on short run equilibrium price is short run market demand. 
Market demand is determined to a great degree by tastes and
preferences of the consumer which are random decisions at a
given level of income.
Tests
Kuhlman's methods will be used to determine if price 
behavior among retail gasoline outlets in Missoula changed 
from one period to the next. One can use Chow tests on 
regression estimates to discover if any alterations in
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pricing relationships between competing firms occurred as a 
result of a non-market event: The Missoulian's article.
Cassady's analysis presents the possibility for some 
interesting statistical tests. Since gasoline prices are 
related to influences such as wholesale prices and 
competitors' retail prices, one can use regression analysis 
to determine their relative contributions to a dealer's
retail price offerings.
To assess the relative contributions of wholesale price 
and competitors' retail prices on one station's pricing 
decisions, one should use daily retail and wholesale price 
levels. Given a certain degree of retail price matching and 
the stated significance of wholesale prices one should
expect to find, in a competitive gasoline market, 
significant t-statistics on both retail and wholesale price 
variables. If competitor's retail prices are significant 
determinants on a firm's retail price, while wholesale 
prices are not significant determinants, the presence of 
vertical influences should be discounted. In this case the 
possibility of horizontal agreements should be closely
scrutinized.
Given Cassady's assertion that dealers may lower their 
margin to save either market shares or increase sales 
volume, one can analyze monthly margins to assess the
competitive position of a firm. As competition increases, a 
firm, in the short run, is likely to decrease margins and 
not pass on a wholesale price increase. As competition
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decreases, a firm, in the short run, is likely to increase 
its margin. However, over the long run, as was previously 
stated, retail prices must approximate wholesale prices or 
there will be entry or exit from the market.
Therefore, using regression analysis on retail and 
wholesale prices, and an analysis of margins, one can 
address the possible presence of a number of influences 
which affect price determination. To reiterate, levels of 
competition can be assessed by an analysis of margins, while 
the presence of vertical or collusive influences can be 
assessed by proper regression analysis.
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Introduction
Chapter Three has two purposes. First, is the summary 
of data used in the analysis. This summary describes where
the data came from and what it contained. Second, is a
description of the methodology which will attempt to 
ascertain two things: First, did the article in The
Missoulian. a non-market event, have any relationship to 
possible changes in the price relationships among the six
outlets studied: Second, did movements in daily retail
prices at Stations 1 and 2 have a relationship to wholesale 
gasoline prices at these two stations?
Data
Throughout the literature review of Chapter Two, 
reference was made to analyses v/hich used retail and 
wholesale prices; Retail and wholesale prices are used in 
this thesis. The data utilized comes from five retail 
gasoline firms operating six outlets in Missoula, Montana. 
The data on retail prices comes from daily station reports 
where the daily price of regular gasoline was recorded. 
These daily reports yielded retail price data from January 
2, 1977 to May 31, 1979. Wholesale prices for regular
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gasoline were received from only two stations, each
operating under the sanction of one company. The wholesale 
price data for both stations runs from January 2, 1977 to 
March 31, 1979, Problems with missing values were
encountered with the wholesale price data. The missing 
observations were removed; therefore, analysis on Station 1 
uses 725 observations while Station 2 uses 738 observations. 
Each daily observation has six retail prices and two 
wholesale prices. The data was placed into a file in the 
University of Montana's DEC 2060 computer.
Empirical Methodology
The empirical tests used to investigate if price
relationships among stations reveal independent action or 
collusion center on regression techniques and Kuhlman's
methodology. Regression analysis, coupled with Chow tests, 
enables one to see if the price relationships among stations 
altered after the publication of The Missoul i a n 's article. 
Regression analysis can also determine the relative
contributions of competitors' prices and wholesale prices on 
the determination of retail prices at Stations 1 and 2. 
Given Cassady's presentation, one should expect to see 
competitors' retail prices and wholesale prices at Stations 
1 and 2 statistically significant determinants of retail 
prices at Stations 1 and 2. Regressions are conducted on 
two regression models:
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(1) Pl=b0+bl(P3)+b2(P4)+b3(P5)+b4{P6)+b5(WPl)+e ,i
and
(2) P2=bO+bl{P3)+b2(P4)+b3(P5)+b4(P6)+b5(WP2)+e ,i
Where : Pl=daily retail price of regular at Station 1,
P2 = 
P3 = 
P4 = 
P5 =
I I  I t  I I  I I  I t  I I
I I  I I  I I  I I  I I  I I
I I  I I  I I  I f  I f  I I
I I  I f  I I  I I  I I  I I
2,
3,
4,
5,
p g —  «  I I  I I  «  I I  I t  f l  g
WPl=daily wholesale price of regular at Station 1, 
WP 2 — ” " II " II II 2
e=error term.
However, before any regression analysis can be 
conducted, the data has to be corrected for autocorrelation. 
Because the data is recorded sequentially over time, an 
observation on Day 2 will be influenced by an observation on 
Day 1. The presence of autocorrelation in the data will 
bias the calculation of the residual sum of squares, 
therefore, regression statistics such as the F-statistics, 
t-statistics and R-squared will be incorrect.(15,pg.208-11) 
The Durbin Two-Step is a technique which corrects a data set 
for autocorrelation. Therefore the Durbin Two -Step is 
employed to correct the data for autocorrelation, then 
models (1) and (2) are estimated.
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If one wants to follow Kuhlman's analysis, the stream 
of data has to be broken into a particular number of time 
periods. Here the data on retail and wholesale prices is 
broken into three periods by using the same technique as Dr. 
O'Donnell. Specifically, price changes for each station 
were charted over time to see if the pattern of price 
changes among all stations exhibited alterations over the 
publication of The Missoulian's article. The first period 
is from January 2,1977 to March 19,1978. Period 2 runs from 
March 20,1978 to July 17,1978. Period 3 goes from July 
18,1978 to March 31,1979. Price behavior in Period 2 is 
important because it begins shortly after the publication of 
The Missoulian’s article. This newspaper article alleged 
that horizontal price activity existed in Missoula, Montana. 
This article is also a non-market event which should not 
trigger alterations in price relationships from Period 1 to 
Period 2 if the guidelines of independent competition are 
followed.
Six regression estimates are produced, one for each of 
the three periods and one for each of the two models. Given 
these regressions, in order to follow Kuhlman's methodology, 
the regression results of each period are compared with 
other periods to discover if the price relationships are 
stable from one period to the next. A statistical test 
which checks the stability in regression relationships over 
time is a Chow t e s t . (15,pg.164-65). A Chow test uses the 
sum of squared residuals of three separate regression
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equations to discover if regression relationships change 
from period to period. The statistical formulation of a 
Chow test is given below (15 y p g .166) .
- ( e^l + e^2)]/KF* =
Where ;
ileh +Ie^2)/(nl + n2 - 2K) .
Te^p=Sum of Squared Residuals for a Pooled Sample;
Ze^l=Sum of Squared Residuals for Sample 1;
2■§.e 2=Sum of Squared Residuals for Sample 2; 
nl=Number of Observations in Sample 1; 
n2=Number of Observations in Sample 2;
K=Number of regression coefficients plus one for
intercept,
The results of a Chow test are interpreted in exactly 
the same manner as those for an F-test. If F* is greater 
than a critical value, the regression relationships between 
two periods are different. If F* is less than a critical 
value, the regressions between two periods are the same and 
the estimated relationships are continuous and without 
shifts.(15,p g .166).
If a Chow test between two periods indicates an 
alteration in the regression relationships of either model 
(1) or model (2), one can assume that price relationships 
between Station 1 and Station 2 changed. This would 
correspond to Kuhlman's approach and hints at the possible 
presence of collusive behavior for which further tests
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should be conducted.
Significant Chow tests can be explained by either a 
change in the Y-intercept (i.e. the constant term) or a 
change in the slope of a regression (i.e. coefficients of 
independent variables in a regression). An analysis of 
covariance can determine which change occurred over the 
relevant time period. (15,p g .282-83) Given a change in the
relationships between the dependent and independent
variables from one period to the next, a possible
explanation may lie with an alteration in the relationship
between prices at Stations 1 and 2 and wholesale prices at 
Stations 1 and 2. Covariance analysis can isolate possible 
changes in the relationship of retail prices and wholesale 
prices at Stations 1 and 2.(22,pg.610-23) The analysis of
covariance is also useful for checking the movements in the 
sign of an estimate over time or the sign of a t-statistic. 
If it is seen that wholesale prices had no effect on the 
alteration of the regressions from period to period, an 
alternative hypothesis of collusive activity is given more 
credibility. If, on the other hand, the differences between
regressions are attributed to differences in the
relationship of retail price and wholesale prices, it is 
possible to advance the inference of independent competitive 
behavior.
If the analysis of covariance shows that wholesale 
prices are not responsible for the differences between 
regressions, it would be interesting to observe the
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stability of wholesale prices over time. If wholesale
prices are stable over time, this would serve as 
corroborating evidence to the fact that wholesale price
influences are not responsible for differences in 
regressions as identified by Chow tests. Exploring the 
stability of wholesale prices is accomplished by the
following models:
(3) WPl=bO+bl(T)+b2(D.V.)+e; ;
(4) WPl=bO+bl(T)+b2(T Squared)+b3(D.V.)+ e ; ;
(5) WP2=bO+bl(T)+b2(D.V.)+ e j ;
(6) WP2=bO+bl(T)+b2(T Squared)+b3(D.V.)+e:;
Where: WPl=Daily wholesale price of regular at Station 1;
WP2= " " " " " " " 2?
T=Integer value of each day from 1/02/77 to 
3/31/7 9;
T Squared=Squared integer value of each day from 
1/02/77 to 3/31/79;
D.V.=Dummy variable of either 0 or 1.
To complement regression analysis and Chow tests, one 
can attempt to assess the movements in the average monthly 
margins at Station 1 and 2 to check the competitive 
situation faced- by these two stations. It is possible to
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observe the movements in monthly margins in Period 2 
relative to margin adjustments in the same months of the 
previous year. If margins in Period 2 show the same 
adjustment pattern as the same months in the previous year, 
one can discount the presence of collusive influences. On 
the other hand, if margins in Period 2 show more extreme 
adjustments than in the same period for the previous year, 
the inference of collusive activity is strengthened.
Conclus ion
In order to apply Cassady's analysis to the six 
stations studied in this thesis, one can incorporate
Kuh l m a n 's price tracking procedure with Preston and King's
analysis of the relationships between prices and costs. 
These procedures are attempted after first correcting the 
data for autocorrelation. Then, regression analysis is
conducted for two stations over three time periods. Chow 
tests are used on the regression results to discern if the 
regressions on each period are significantly different from 
other periods. If the regressions are different, the 
analysis of covariance will check to see if the differences
come from alterations in the relationship of retail prices 
to wholesale prices. If covariance analysis shows that 
differences in regressions do indeed come from variations in 
the relationship of retail to wholesale prices, then, one 
can only conclude that the changes in pricing relationships
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between firms are not due to collusive behavior. If 
wholesale and retail price relationships do not change over 
the periods, the inference of horizontal pricing activity 
such as collusion, is strengthened.
Assuming that no alteration is identified in retail and 
wholesale price relationships, regressions are conducted 
which examine the stability of wholesale prices over time. 
Out of this analysis one might be able to produce 
corroborating evidence to the fact that altering price 
relationships between stations had nothing to do with 
wholesale prices.
The empirical analysis is concluded with a review of 
average monthly margins. If margins in Period 2 indicate 
the same movements as margins in the same months of the 
previous year, evidence of competitive behavior is 
strengthened. On the other hand, if margins in Period 2 
show different movements relative to margins for the same 
months in the previous year, the inference of collusion is 
reinforced.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Introduction
Chapter Four gives step by step results of the
methodology put forth in Chapter 3, First, a description of 
the procedure which corrects for autocorrelation. Results 
are then presented. Second, an articulation of the 
regression results derived for equations which estimate the 
retail price of regular gasoline at Stations 1 and 2.
Third, a description of the Chow tests used on the
regression results generated in the second part of this 
analysis. Fourth, a presentation of the results generated 
by the analysis of covariance. Fifth, presentation of the 
findings of the regressions on wholesale price stability. 
Last is a presentation of the analysis of average monthly 
margins at both Stations 1 and 2.
Autocorrelation and The Durbin Two-Step Correction
Autocorrelation is a statistical phenomenon associated 
with time series data. Given that in most time series
observations, the value of the observation on Day 2 is
related to the value of the observation of Day 1, the
observations are not independent. Therefore, the
>1 /-
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independence criterion of Ordinary Least Squares regression 
is violated. The consequences of autocorrelation ultimately 
manifest themselves in biased variances of the parameter 
estimates and the error term, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of incorrect inference based upon biased 
statistical indicators.(15,pg.208-11) A quick check on the 
degree of autocorrelation is given by the Durbin-Watson 
statistic. Positive autocorrelation is indicated by the 
Durbin-Watson statistic when it is "close" to or equal to
zero. Negative autocorrelation is indicated when the 
Durbin-Watson statistic is "close" to four. When the
Durbin-Watson statistic is "close" to or equal to two, there 
is no autocorrelation.(3,pg.259) A word of caution should be 
advanced pertaining to the use of the Durbin-Watson 
statistic. In a model which uses lagged variables, the 
Durbin-watson statistic is a biased indicator of
autocorrelation. One should then utilize the Durbin 'h '
statistic.{3,pg.260-61)
One procedure developed to correct for autocorrelation 
is the Durbin Two-Step. The Durbin Two-Step is a method 
which uses, in the first step, a lagged version of the 
original model to estimate the numerical form (i.e. 
correction factor) of the data's autocorrelation. Once the 
correction factor is generated, the second step uses the 
correction to transform the original data into new data 
which has no autocorrelation.(15,p g .224-25) The procedure is 
as follows:
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Given the original model:
(1) Pl=bO+bl(P3)+b2(P4)+b3(P5)+b4(P6)+b5(WPl)+e ,i
Step one uses regression analysis on the model,
P1=4dO+p (PI ) +bl (P3) +b2 (P3̂ _p +b3 (P4) +b4 (P4̂ .,) +b5 (P5) +b6 (P5̂ .,) 
+b7 (P6) +b8 (P6, ,) +b9 (WPl) +blO (WPL ,) +e. .
Where 'p ' is an estimate of the correction factor necessary 
for transformations. After doing step one on the lagged 
model, p=.47642. Step two uses p to transform the original 
data in the following manner:
Pl*=[Pl-p(Pl,„)
P2*=[P2-p(P2,.p 
P3*=[P3-p(P3^.,)
P4*= [P4-p(P4__)
P5*= [P5-p(P5 ,)
P6*= [P6-p(P6^.,)
WP1*= [WPl-p(WPL,,) ]
WP2*=[WP2-p(WP2^ ] .
Regressions are then conducted over three periods using each 
of the following e q u a t i o n s : (15,pg.229)
(1) Pl*=bO+bl(P3*)+b2(P4*)+b3(P5*)+b4(P6*)+b5(WPl*)+e^.
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(2) P2*=bO+bl(P3*) +b2(P4*) +b3 (P5*) +b4(P6*) +b5 (WP2*) +e
Regression Results
The six regressions developed by using equations (1) 
and (2) of the previous section are summarized in Tables 1 
and 2. Table 1 shows results for Station 1 while Table 2 
shows results for Station 2. In Table 1, results of the 
t-statistic, for Period 1, show that daily retail prices on 
regular gasoline for Stations 3, 4, 5, and 6 are all
significant contributors to the price of regular gasoline at 
Station 1. While the competitors' daily prices are 
significant determinates on Station I's daily price. Station 
I's wholesale gasoline prices are not. The R-squared 
results indicate very good results with an R-squared of 
.95178 while the F-statistic is equal to 1373.90238. The 
F-statistic indicates that the entire regression equation is 
statistically significant. The Durbin-Watson statistic, 
given by D-W in Table 1 is equal to 1.89. This indicates 
that there is no autocorrelation in the equation. Although 
the D-W does not equal 2, one can suspect that there is no 
positive autocorrelation at the 1.0% level by using the 
equation of d < d* < (4-d ) where d is equal to 1.65 with 
five independent variables.(15,pg.215 and 666) Therefore, 
1.65 < 1.89 < 2.35. Given no autocorrelation, the results 
on the t-statistics, F-statistic, and R-squared are
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reliable.
Period 2 of Table 1 indicates peculiar behavior when 
compared to the results of Period 1, First, the estimate of 
R-squared falls to ,35684 while the F-statistic drops to 
12.42. It should be noted that the value F-statistic is 
still significant. Second, the t-statistic on each 
independent variable also exhibits peculiar behavior. In 
Period 1, all competitors' prices were significant variables 
in the regression. In Period 2, however, prices at only 
Stations 3 and 5 remained significant determinates on the 
price of gasoline at Station 1. Station I's wholesale 
gasoline price remains an insignificant determinant on its 
retail price. The The D-W statistic of 2.23 indicates no
autocorrelation. While higher than that of Period 1, the 
D-W statistic still indicates no problems with 
autocorrelation.
Period 3 on Table 1 shows that retail prices at
Stations 3 and 5 are significant determinates of daily
retail prices at Station 1. As in the previous periods, the 
wholesale price of gasoline at Station 1 does not contribute 
to the retail price Station 1 charges. Relative to Period 
2, the R-squared in Period 3 has increased to 85.96%. The 
F-statistic has also increased from the previous period to 
302.34. The D-W statistic continues to indicate no
autocorrelation in the model.
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TABLE 1
Regression Results for P̂ *, = f(Pg*, P4 *, P5 *, Pg*, & WP̂ *)
Period N of Cases
354
r2 = .95178 Ad; 
RSS = 610,266.60288
Period N of Cases 
2 118
r2 = .35684 Adj. 
RSS = 1,172,680.24814
Period N of Cases 
3 253
r2 = .85956 Ad. 
RSS = 833,177.55622
Variable Coefficient X
(constant)p.*
P4 *
r : :WPl*
- 191.27344
0.13998
- 0.17639 
0.87879 
0.19191 
0.02612
- 1.908 
4.031
- 3.875 
26.3454.437
1.262
r2 = .95109 F = 1373.90238
Variable Coefficient T
(constant)
Pi*
P4*P5*
Pe*WPl*
459.47930 0.32437 
- 0.02884 
0.33622 
0.00224 
0.22134
1.077 
3.099 
- 0.205 
3.747 
0.017 
0.963
r2 = .32812 F = 12.42779
Vari able Coefficient X
(constant)P3*
P4 *P5 *
P6*WPl*
33.46956
0.376330-07841 
0.48437 
0.05868 
- 0.01579
0.291 
5.036 
1.098 7.917 
0 . 8 8 6  
- 0.249
r2 = .85671 F = 302.34002
Significant T
.0572
.0001
.0001
.0000
.0000
.2079
D-W = 1.89
Significant I
.2837
.0025
.8380
.0003
.9863.3377
D-W = 2.23
Significant I
.7712
.0000
.2731
.0000
.3762
.8036
D-W = 2.13
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Table 2 indicates results for Station 2 which are 
similar to those of Station 1 represented in Table 1. in 
Period 1, R-Squared is .90893 while the F-statistic is
significant at 720.62942. A glance at the t-statistics
indicate that prices of Stations 3, 5 and 6 are significant
contributors to the daily price at Station 2. The 
t-statistics also indicate that the daily wholesale gasoline 
price at Station 2 has an insignificant contribution to 
Station 2*s daily retail price. The D-W of 2.39 is fairly
high and registers as an inconclusive test on the presence 
of negative autocorrelation.(15,pg.214) At the 1% level of 
significance, with five independent variables, the 
inconclusive range of the D-W test begins at 2.35 and runs 
to 2,56.(15,pg.214 and 666) While the D-W is very close to 
the value which registers no autocorrelation, one must be 
careful in stating the reliability of the regression 
results.
Regression results for Period 2 on Table 2 indicate, as 
they did for Period 2 in Table 1, a drop in both the
R-squared estimate and the F-statistic. Significant
determinates on the daily retail price at Station 2 are 
daily prices at Stations 3 and 5. Stations 4 and 6, along
with the daily wholesale price of regular at Station 2 are
not statistically significant contributors to the dependent 
variable. Station 2's daily retail price. The D-W statistic 
of 2.23 is an indication of no autocorrelation.
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TABLE 2
Regression Results for P2* = f (P3*, P4 *, P5 *, P5 *, & WP2*)
Period N of Cases Variable Coefficient 
1 367 (constant)
P3*
P4 *
P5 *
Pe*WP2*
r2 = .90893 Adj. r2 = .90767 
RSS = 1,184,169.52681
Period N of Cases
I Significant T
118 (constant)Pi*P4*P5*
P6*WP2*
r2 = 
RSS
,35215 Adj. r2 = .32323 
1,210,979.09653
Period N of Cases Variable Coefficient
- 204.23058 - 1.424 .1552
0.19222 4.260 . 0 0 0 0- 0.09081 - 1.475 .1411
0.76266 18.125 . 0 0 0 00.17177 2.931 .0036
0.02861 0.966 .3349
F = 720.62942 D-W = 2.39
Coefficient X Significant T
448.69428 1.016 .31170.37214 3.498 .0007
- 0.07823 - 0.550 .5833
0.32633 3.575 .0005
0.37214 0.170 .8655
0.26453 1.124 .2633
F = 12.17613 D-W = 2.23
X Significant I
253 (constant)Pi* P4* Pc*
Pg*
WP2*
71.56719
.37303
.08424
.49551
.06130
.04676
0.561 4.980 
1.180 
7.810 
0.925 
- 0.618
.5753
.0000
.2393
.0000
.3561
.5373
r2 = .85974 Adj. r2 = .85690 
RSS = 832,100.74081
F = 302.79520 D-W = 2.13
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Period 3 in Table 2 gives regression results similar to 
Period 3 of Table 1. The R-Squared estimate is .85956 while 
the F-statistic is significant by showing a value of 302.34. 
The D-W statistic of 2.13 indicates no autocorrelation in 
the model. Again, only two independent variables are 
significant contributors to the explanation of Station 2's 
daily retail price movements. These variables are, as in 
Period 2, daily retail prices of Stations 3 and 5. Daily 
wholesale price at Station 2 does not contribute to the 
determination of daily retail prices.
Given regression results shown in Tables 1 and 2, it is
evident that both stations exhibited very similar price
relationships with other firms. The movement of R-Squared 
from period to period for each of the two models shown in 
Tables 1 and 2, are very similar for each station. 
Movements in F-statistics are also similar from period to 
period for both stations. The adjustments in t-statistics 
for each station over the three periods also show many
similarities. In Period 1 at Station 1 variables
representing competitors' retail prices are all significant. 
Period 1 for Station 2, however, shows only three 
significant variables in the determination of daily retail 
price at Station 2. The other regressions for following
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periods indicate no differences in the number of significant 
variables on retail price determination at either Station 1 
or Station 2. The general pattern of the residual sum of
squares (RSS) is also similar for each model.
The movements in R-Squared and RSS call into question 
the similarity of estimated relationships from period to 
period. Considering Kuhlman's analysis, if the 
relationships among firms changed from period to period, 
where the delineation of periods is defined by a non-market 
event, the possibility of horizontal activity is increased. 
Through the use of Chow tests one can test if two regression 
estimates are different from period to period. Therefore 
Chow tests are conducted and results are given in Tables 3 
and 4 for Stations 1 and 2, respectively.
Table 3 shows that the regression relationships between
Periods 1 and 2 changed. In other words, the relationships 
estimated by regression analysis for Period 1 changed in 
Period 2. Period 1 is also different from Period 3. The 
Chow test result for Periods 2 and 3 showed no significant
differences in the estimated relationships among variables.
Table 4 shows results for Station 2 which match those
for Station 1. Specifically, the regression estimate of
Period 1 is different from the regression estimates of both 
Periods 2 and 3. The relationships estimated for Periods 2 
and 3 show no significant difference. Therefore, the
relationships among variables at Station 1 and 2 in Period 1 
are different from the relationships among variables in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Page 5 3a
TABLE 3
CHOW Test for Station 1, = f(P3*, P4*, P5 *, Pg* & WPi*)
F* =
[Ee2p - (Eê l + Eê 2)]/K
(Ee^l + Ee^2)/(̂ 1 ^2 - 2(K))
Periods 1 & 2 
ê n = 2,030,142.04580
e2 i = 610,266.60288
6 ^ 2 = 1,172,680.24814
ni = 354
0 2 = 118K = 6
F* = 10.62938
V% = 6
V2 = 460
Critical .F.qi = 2.80
Periods 2 & 3
e2p = 2,065,258.71614 
e^l = 1,172,680.24814 
ê 2 = 833,177.55622
0 3 = 118
0 2 = 253K = 6
F* = 1.77188
Vi = 6
V2 = 359Critical F.qi = 2.80
Periods 1 & 3
e2p = 1,566,299.09281 
610,266.60288 
833,177.55622 
354 
253 
6
n02
K
F* = 8.44036
V% = 6
V2 = 595Critical F.qi = 2.80
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CHOW Tests for Station 2 ?2* = f(P3*, P4 *, P5 *, P5 * & WP2 )
[Eê p - (Eê l + Eê 2)]/KF* =
(Ee^l + Ee^2) / + 02 - 2(K))
Ie'̂ 2
ni
H2K
Periods 1 & 2
= 2,585,642.67944 
= 1,184,169.52681 
= 1,210,979.09653
367
118
6
F* = 6.26987
Vi = 6
V2 = 473Critical F.qi = 2.80
Periods 2 & 3
e2p = 2,112,906.89498 
e^l = 1,210,979.09653 
ê 2 = 832,100.74081= 118 
H2 = 253
K - 6
F* = 2.04494
V% = 6
V2 = 359Critical F.qi = 2.80
Periods 1 & 3
e2 p 2,087,041= 1,184,169
e^ 2 - 832,100
ni - 367
n2 = 253K 6
F* s 3.55679
n 6
\lo 608Critical F.qi =
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Periods 2 and 3. Given significant differences in the 
relationships among variables in Period 1 and the following 
periods, the analysis of covariance is conducted in the next 
section.
Analysis of Covariance
The alteration between Period 1 and the following 
periods may be a result of a shift in the constant term 
(i.e. Y-Intercept) or a change in the coefficients (i.e. 
slope) of the regression estimates. Given a change in the 
estimated relationships specified in the regressions of 
Tables 1 and 2, the alterations between periods could 
emanate from a change in the relationships among 
competitors' prices or a change in the relationships between 
the dependent variable and wholesale prices. According to 
both Cassady and Weiss, the price of gasoline, at the retail 
level, incorporates the wholesale price of gasoline. Both 
authors estimate that the wholesale price of gasoline makes 
up at least 75% of the retail price.(27,5,pg.395 and 243 
respectively) Therefore, retail price behavior should be a 
reflection of movements in wholesale prices. Given an 
alteration in price relationships from period to period, as 
indicated by Chow tests, one should expect to observe 
changes in the relationship of retail prices to wholesale 
prices. The analysis of covariance is a method which can
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identify sources of variation which occur between two 
different estimated relationships. This is accomplished by 
incorporating dummy variables and interaction variables into 
a regression model.(22,p g .610-21)
Equations 3, 4, 5 and 6 express the forms of the models 
which conduct the analysis of covariance. These models 
focus on the relationship of wholesale prices to retail 
prices over the periods studied.
(3) Pl*=bO+bl{P3*)+b2 (P4*)+b3 (P5*)+b4 (P6*)+bS {WPl*)+b6 (D2)+b7(D3)+b8 (212)+b9 (Z13)+e^,
(4) P2*=bO+bl(P3*)4b2 (P4*)+b3(P5*)+b4 (P6*)+b5 (VJP2*)+b6 (D2)+b7{D3)+b8 (222)+b9 (Z23)+e^,
(5) Pl*=bO+bl(P3*)4-b2 (P4*)+b3(P5*)+b4 (P6*)+bS (WPl*)+b6 (D2)4t7(D3)+e.,
(6) P2*=b0+bl(P3*) +b2 (P4*)4b3 (PS*) +b4 (P6*) +bS (VJP2*) +b6 (D2) +b7 (03) .
Where :
02=1 if retail and wholesale prices are in Period 2;
02=0 if retail and wholesale prices are in Periods 1
or 3 ;
03=1 if retail and wholesale prices are in Period 3 ;
03=0 if retail and wholesale prices are in Periods 1
or 2 ;
Z 12=02 *V7P1* ;
Z13=03*WP1*;
Z22=D2*WP2*;
Z23=03*WP2*.
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Analysis of Covariance
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Pi* = f(p3*. P4*, P5*, P6*, & WPl*, 02, 03, Z12, Z13)
N of Cases Variable Coefficient St. Error T Significant T
725 (constant) - 117.26778 130.05904 - 0.902 .3675P3* 0.28765 0.03494 8.233 .0000
P4* 0.00135 0.04133 0.033 .9740
P5* 0.60772 0.03156 19.253 .0000
P6* 0.12253 0.03745 3.272 .0011WPl* 0.01387 0.02896 0.479 .6321
02 519.31656 288.89000 1.798 .0727
03 177.12922 181.38072 0.977 .3291
Z12 - 0.18802 .10452 - 1.799 .0725
Z13 - 0.06298 .06409 - 0.983 .3261
r2 = .92558 Adj. r2 = .92465 F = 988.10497 D-W = 2 . 1 1
RSS = 2,877,660.30628
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TABLE 6
Analysis of Covariance Con't
P2* “ f(P3*, P4 *, P5*» Pe*, & WP2*, 02, 03. Z22, Z23)
N of Cases Variable Coefficient St. Error T Signif icar
738 (constant) - 128.82168 146.96543 - 0.877 .3810
P3* 0.30635 0.03674 8.338 . 0 0 0 0P4* 0.01908 0.04411 0.433 .6655
P5* 0.57475 0.03317 17.330 . 0 0 0 0
Pa* 0.12074 0.04012 3.009 .0027
Wo* 0.01634 0.03259 0.501 .6163
0 2 552.70420 319.83018 1.728 .0844
03 234.21119 215.56057 1.087 .2776
Z22 - 0.20049 0.11568 - 1.733 .0835
Z23 - 0.08236 0.07599 - 1.084 .2788
r2 = .91235 Adj. r2 = .91127 F = 842.02093 D-W' = 2.23
RSS = 3,419.168.72921
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Equations (3) and (4) check for changes in the
coefficient on wholesale prices over the entire 810 day
period. Equations (5) and (6 ) check for shifts in the
constant term. If, in equations (3) and (4), the 
interaction variables (Z12, Z13, Z22 and 223) are
significant, the differences identified by the Chow tests 
are attributed to changes in the coefficients on wholesale 
price. If, in equations (5) or (6 ), the coefficients on D2 
or D3 are significant, the differences identified by the
Chow tests are attributed to changes in the constant term.
The results of equations (3), (4), (5), and (6 ) are in
Tables 5, 6 , 7, and 8 respectively.
Table 5 indicates that the interaction variables of 
equation (3) are insignificant. This implies that there is 
not enough variation in the equation to register a change in 
the coefficient on wholesale price, WPl. The overall 
regression is significant as indicated by an F-statistic of 
988.10497. The R-Squared is .92558 and there is no 
indication of autocorrelation. As in previous regression 
results, daily wholesale price is an insignificant
contributor to the daily retail price of gasoline at Station 
1.
Table 6 shows results of equation (4). These results, 
like those for equation (3), indicate that there is not 
enough variation in the estimated relationship to register 
an alteration in the coefficient on wholesale price at 
Station 2, V7P2. As with equation (3), equation (4) has a
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TABLE 7
Analysis of C o v a riance Con't
P%* = f(P3*, P5 *, P6*, & WPl*, 02, 03)
N of Cases Variable Coefficient St. Error I Significant I
725 (constant) 19.97004 80.63558 0.248 .8045P3* 0.28794 0.03473 8.292 .0000
P4* - 0.01104 0.04080 - 0.271 .7868
PS* 0.59949 0.03112 19.267 .0000
Pe* 0.12249 0.03744 3.271 . 0 0 1 1
WPl* - 0.01422 0.02022 - 0.703 .4822
D2 0.22170 7.61689 0.029 .9768
03 3.62634 10.16979 0.357 .7215
r2 = .92523 Adj. r2 = .92450 F = 1267.44732 D-W = 2.10
RSS = 2,891,371.35575
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?2* = f(P3*. P4 *. P5*. P5 *, & WP2*, 02, 03)
N of Cases Vari able Coefficient St. Error T Significant I
738 (constant) 35.45550 89.88897 0.394 .6934P3* 0.30541 0.03649 8.368 . 0 0 0 0
P a * 0.00599 0.04355 0.137 .8907
?5* 0.56461 0.03251 17.366 . 0 0 0 0
?s* 0.12046 0.04355 3.005 .0027
Wo* - 0.01718 0.02265 - 0.759 .4484
0 2 - 0.87612 8.20755 - 0.107 .915003 5.60083 11.19408 0.500 .6170
r2 = .91196 Adj. r2 = .91112 F = 1080.23578 D-W = 2.22
RSS = 3,434,573.40168
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good R-Squared and a significant F-statistic. The D-M 
statistic, at 2.23, gives an indication that autocorrelation 
is not present. The daily wholesale price of gasoline has 
no significant effect on the daily retail price of gasoline 
at Station 2.
Table 7 presents results for equation (5). Equation 
(5) tests for a shift in the constant term over three
periods at Station 1. The t-statistics on D2 and D3 are 
insignificant; therefore, one cannot infer that the 
estimated relationship shifted over the periods studied. 
The F-statistic is equal to 1267.44732 while R-Squared is 
.92523. The D-W statistic of 2.09630 indicates no
autocorrelation in the model.
Table 8 indicates results for Station 2 which are very 
similar to those expressed in Table 7. First, the
t-statistics on D2 and D3 are insignificant. Therefore, no 
shift in the constant term is evident. Second, the
F-statistic is significant at a value of 1080.23578. The 
estimate on R-Squared is also similar to that for equation
(5). In equation (6 ) R-Squared is equal to .91196. The D-W 
statistic is equal to 2.22 thus indicating no 
autocorrelation. As in previous models, the daily wholesale 
price of gasoline is a statistically insignificant 
determinate on daily retail price at Station 2.
Wholesale Pric^ Stability:
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Given the results of Chow tests and the analysis of 
covariance^ an analysis of wholesale prices over time is 
used to generate possible corroborating evidence to the 
stability of wholesale prices. The analysis of covariance 
indicates that wholesale prices did not contribute to the 
alterations identified by Chow tests. Therefore, one more 
regression procedure may produce confirmation of the fact 
that price adjustments at Stations 1 and 2 do not reflect 
movements in wholesale prices from Period 1 to Period 2.
Equations (7) and (8 ), given below, incorporate dummy 
variables to check for a shift in wholesale prices from 
Period 1 to Period 2.
(7) WPl=bO+bl(T)+b2(T Squared)+b3(D.V.)+e .,
(8 ) WP2=bO+bl(T)+b2(T Squared)+b3(D.V.)+e
Where :
T=Integer value of each day from 12/01/77 to 
7/15/7 8 ;
T Squared=Squared value of integer days from 
12/01/78 to 7/15/78;
D.V.=1 if observation is after March 20,1978; 
I3.V.=0 if observation is before March 21, 1978.
The period of 12/01/77 to 7/15/78 consists of 222 days where
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the midpoint is March 20, 1978, two days after the
publication of The Missoulian's article and the first day of 
Period 2. The results of equations (7) and (8 ) are in 
Tables 9 and 10 for Stations 1 and 2 respectively. 
T-Squared is put into the equation to discover if wholesale 
price movements demonstrate a curvilinear pattern.
By observing the t-statistics in Table 9, one can see
that the wholesale price function at Station 1 (i.e.
equation 7), does not shift over the period of December,
1977 to July, 1978, It is evident that there is a slightly
positive curvilinear relationship of wholesale prices and 
time. R-Squared is .67624 while the F-statistic is 148.994. 
The D-W statistic is 2.107, indicating no autocorrelation.
Table 10 indicates results for Station 2 (i.e.
equation 8 ). The t-statistic on the dummy variable is 
insignificant, indicating no shift in the wholesale price 
pattern. The R-Squared is 62% while the F-statistic is 
significant at 117,201. The D-W statistic of 1.98 indicates 
no autocorrelation is present in the model.
Given the results shown in Tables 9 and 10, it is 
apparent that the findings on wholesale price in the 
analysis of covariance are corroborated. There is no shift 
in the wholesale price pattern which can explain the 
differences in retail price behavior identified by Chow 
tests.
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TABLE 9
Regression Results on WPj*, = f(T, l2 & d1)
N of Cases Variable Coefficient St. Error T Significant T
218 (constant)
t2
D1
1185.25893
■ 14.57227
0.01790
■ 1.93684
41.78544
1.27660
0.00140
2.99269
28.365
11.493
12.740
0.647
.0000
.0000
.0000
.5182
r2 = .57624 Adj. r2 = .67170 
RSS = 26,520.63324
F = 148.99399 D-W = 2.11
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TABLE 10
Regression Results on WP2*, = f(T, l2 & d2)
N of Cases Variable Coefficient St. Error T Significant T
(constant) 954.05441 38.82504 24.573 . 0 0 0 0I - 14.51641 1.46454 - 9.912 . 0 0 0 0j2 0.01763 0.00161 10.982 . 0 0 0 0
0 2 - 0.43066 2.75932 - 0.156 .8761
Adj. r2 = .61634 F = 117.20052 D-W = 1.98
RSS = 22,547.31515
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Margin Analysis
The selling price in any retailing business usually is 
made up of the cost of goods sold and a gross raargin . If 
the gross margin is greater than the operating expenses of 
retail business, the remainder is referred to as a net 
margin.(27,pg.394) Given high elasticity of demand, high 
margins do not necessarily translate into high profits. In 
some instances, a retailer can increase total profit by 
decreasing the retail price and selling a greater volume. 
(27,pg.395) In some case, high margins are indicative of 
more expensive service. However, Weiss goes on to say that 
"In some instances, as we shall see, high margins may also 
reflect monopoly restrictions."(27,pg,395) Typically, when 
competitive pressures increase, such as in a price war, 
retail prices will drop thus placing a "squeeze” on the 
gross margin. One can assess competitive behavior by 
analyzing gross margins. Given elastic demand at a 
particular station, when competition is keen, the margins 
will be low. When competitive pressure is not intense, 
margins will be high.
Tables 11 and 12 show the actual average monthly margin 
for Stations 1 and 2, respectively. They also indicate an 
estimate of the yearly average for both years at both 
stations. Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the 
data in Tables 11 and 12. In Figure 1 one can see 
interesting movements. There appears to be a seasonal trend 
in the movement of average monthly margins. Margins are
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TABLE 11
Station 1
Average Average
Month Margin '77 Margin '78
Jan i 7.53 t 4.58
Feb 5.42 5.35Mar 5.38 3.45
Apr 5.36 3.39
May 3.59 3.00
Jun 4.64 2.49
July 4.62 2 . 8 8
Aug 8 . 1 0 5.15
Sep 8.47 3.57
Oct 7.18 6.69
Nov 6.09 7.70
Dec 4.81 6.77
X'77 = 5.932 X'78 = 4.585
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TABLE 12
Station 2
Average Average
Month Margin '77 Margin '78
Jan t 6.98 t 4.98
Feb 4.56 5.87
Mar 4.65 3.74
Apr 6 . 0 2 3.25
May 5.08 3.15
Jun 4.34 3.64
July 4.56 3.46
Aug 6.91 4.82
Sep 7.98 3.55
Oct 7.34 7,00
Nov 5.79 6.65
Dec 4.89 7.38
X'77 = 5.591 X'78 = '
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highest during winter months, when consumers are reluctant 
to brave icy roads. Thus, demand is low and so is the 
competitive pressure felt by gasoline dealers. As warm 
weather approaches during spring months, driving increases 
and margins decrease. Specifically, one can see a drop in 
the gross margin from March 1977 to May 1977' for both 
stations. From May to September of 1977 the monthly margins 
at both stations show a steady rise. In 1978, the year 
which includes Period 2, monthly margins for Station 1 
dropped from February to June. From June to August, Station 
1 shows a continual increase in its gross margins. The 
lowest margin for either station is recorded in June of 1978 
at Station 1. June of 1978 is included in Period 2 of the 
regression analysis. While monthly margins declined in the 
first half of both years, the decline in 1978 is longer and 
more drastic than the decline in the first half of 1977. 
For Station 1, the margin of June, 1978 is 2.49 cents per 
gallon. The margins in 1978 at each station reach the 7 
cents per gallon range but never regain the levels of 1977.
A glance at Table 11 indicates that the yearly average 
margin in 1977 is about 1.5 cents per gallon higher than in
1978. Table 12 shows that for Station 2, the 1977 average 
yearly margin is slightly under a penny more than the 
average yearly margin in 1978.
The average monthly margins indicate that in 1978 the 
margins are lower than in 1977. The monthly margins reached 
a minimum in June of 1978 at Station 1. The movements in
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monthly margins from March of 1978 to July of that same year 
indicate generally lower margins than in the same period of 
the previous year. These results indicate that competitive 
pressures increased at both stations in 1978 relative to 
1977. Moreover, since the monthly margins reached an 
overall minimum in June of 1978, which is included in Period 
2, one can speculate that the article in The Missoulian had 
an effect on the competitive behavior of Stations 1 and 2. 
This effect is one which increased competition and therefore 
lends credibility to an inference of collusion on the part 
of the five gasoline firms studied in this thesis.
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C H A P T E R  F I V E
Introduction
This last chapter discusses three issues. First, a 
presentation of the conclusions produced by this thesis. 
Second, a discussion of policy recommendations which speak 
to the use of statistical techniques in assessing the 
possibility of horizontal pricing agreements. Last, a 
presentation of the model's limitations and problems.
Conclusions
Empirical investigation produces three significant 
results. First, and perhaps most important, wholesale 
prices of gasoline are not statistically significant 
contributors to the determination of daily retail price at 
Stations 1 and 2. Second, Chow tests indicate that 
regressions of Period 1 differ from regressions in either 
Period 2 or Period 3. This implies that the relationships 
found in Period 1 changed relative to the relationships 
found in Periods 2 or 3. Given that the beginning of Period 
2 closely coincides with the publication of The Missoulian's 
article, a non-market event, John Kuhlman's procedure
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suggests that differences identified by Chow tests indicate 
possible collusive behavior in the retail gasoline market. 
Third, empirical results from the analysis of covariance 
indicate that the differences identified by Chow tests are 
not attributed to changes in either the coefficient on 
wholesale price or a change in the constant term. Given the 
results of covariance procedure, one can only conclude that 
alterations between periods emanate from alterations in the 
relationships between competitors' retail prices. This 
finding is substantiated by the regressions which check the 
stability of wholesale prices over time. These regressions 
indicate that the pattern of wholesale prices did not shift 
when the retail prices did indeed show alterations in 
regression relationships. This analysis confirms the 
earlier work conducted by Dr. O'Donnell and improves the 
model's specificity in the wholesale price analysis.
The analysis of average monthly margins indicates that 
in Period 2, the margins at Stations 1 and 2 are at their 
lowest levels. The overall average yearly margin is lower 
in 1978 than in the previous year. Moreover, the movements 
in March, April, May and June of 1977 do not drop to as low 
a point as they do in the same months of 1978. Therefore, 
given assertions advanced by both Weiss and Cassaoy, 
competitive pressures in 1978 are greater than those in 
1977.
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Given the above results, this thesis concludes that the 
observed alterations in retail price patterns of Stations 1 
and 2 have no relationship to the pattern of wholesale 
prices. Moreover, it is seen that retail prices at 
competing stations have a highly significant effect on the 
determination of retail prices at Stations 1 and 2. While 
it is normal to have competitors' prices influence pricing 
at a particular station, it is unusual that wholesale prices 
have no effect.
One might try to conclude that Station 1 and 2 are 
merely acting as price takers and that the price they offer 
is set by the equilibrium conditions of perfectly 
competitive markets. Given this argument. Period 2 is a 
period of disequilibrium which could occur from disruptions 
in supply, entry or exit, cost movements or demand 
fluctuations. However, none of these disruptions are 
evident in the study periods. Therefore, the disruptions 
noticed in Period 2 may very well have no association to 
measurable market influences. The possibility of collusion 
is thus increased.
Policv Recommendations
Utilizing an analysis based on price tracking can be an 
unquestionable aide in determining the competitive behavior 
of a market. However, results generated by this analysis
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may be difficult to understand in most forums of inquiry. 
Therefore, the most beneficial use of this technique is in 
the area of research on industries or markets especially 
prone to horizontal agreements. Research such as this would 
probably aid in saving downstream costs of litigation.
af Methodolp.qy
The first limitation one encounters with this model 
lies with the data requirements. The data needed is usually 
confidential and can only be received by court order. 
Second, one should have a firm understanding of market 
structure before attempting this analysis. Price matching 
is not necessarily an indication of misdeeds and in some 
markets is accepted as the normal price behavior. 
Therefore, without an understanding of a market structure's 
price behavior, incorrect inference is very likely.
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